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Abstract. In times of crisis such as a pandemic, local governments serve a pivotal role as first- hand responders in managing
emergencies in local areas, with the expectation of an effective policy to implement. Notwithstanding, there are limited literature
studies of emergency management on local governments, concentrating on identifying policy effectiveness by the implementation
in the field. This article emphasizes the effectiveness of local policy implementation in managing the emergency of the COVID-19
pandemic in the Jakarta area, with the centralization on Large-Scale Social Restriction as the case study. The objective is to
provide lessons related to coronavirus for the government to evaluate future policies. Using secondary data analysis as a method,
the findings would diagnose the empirical stratum of the local government's implementation in handling COVID-19, which
defines the policy's effectiveness. The validity of the data was determined by comparing provincial government policies to central
government (Presidential and Ministry policies), and the mass media as a portrayal of the field situation. The result of this analysis
is intended to propound insights to public managers in the hope of receiving a more profound comprehension of their possibility
and improving their enactment in handling a crisis.
Keywords: Emergency Management, COVID-19, Large-Scale Social Restriction (PSBB), Policy Implementation and
effectiveness, Local Government

INTRODUCTION
In a world full of uncertainty, every individual
needs assurance to survive challenging circumstances.
Those who can provide guaranteed protection must
require or have the appropriate knowledge with the
available opportunity. One of the biggest tragedies
of the 21st century transpired in the year 2020.
Coronavirus has taken its toll on most of the world’s
population with its easy transmission through droplets and striking respiratory system, making society
of various ages, genders, and classes live in endangerment. When the WHO director-general made the
first statement on IHR Emergency Committee on 22
January 2020, along with the press briefing a week
after on WHO’s mission regarding the novel coronavirus outbreak, the world gradually became different
(World Health Organization, 2020). The first 584
cases, including 17 deaths on 23 January 2020, was
noted by WHO, with most reported from China, followed by those found in Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Thailand, the United States of America,
and Vietnam (World Health Organization, 2020). The
issue regarding the novel coronavirus and COVID-19
became a significant challenge for multiple countries
around the world. Descending health immunity, and
financial problems spiked due to the number of measures that the government took. The pandemic made
an abounding loss as millions of lives were taken per

now by the virus and collapsing health systems in many
countries by the overwhelming condition. Moreover,
it disrupted the socio-economic sphere, with much
of the factors at 90% for economic recession attributed to lack of compliance from the community itself
(Matiza, 2020). Coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic is
therefore regarded as an emergency due to its rapid
transmission, which compromises many lives, needing immediate responses to reduce more significant
risks. Due to its advent becoming an emergency state,
weighty policies with appropriate approaches were
requisite to control the retrograding outbreak.
The situation worldwide varied as many countries began to enact restriction orders as a response
at the beginning of the pandemic. However, despite
the predicament at the global level, the management
appears to be different for each country. In Italy, the
first official COVID-19 case was detected back on 21
February and became the worst-hit European country by COVID-19 infection in early 2020, reaching
101,723 already by 30 March. As an abundance of
hospital beds, particularly in ICUs, around the country
are on the brink of collapsing, the Italian government
ordered many restrictions to maintain the condition,
including a nationwide lockdown (The New York
Times, 2021; Santacroce et al., 2020). In the United
States, federal funding unlocked billions of dollars
to combat the disease spread and issue travel and
trade advisories by customs and border patrols. At
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the same time, each state manages its responses to
the pandemic. Cases in the United States escalated
quickly around May. The death toll surpassed 100,000
on 28 May and reached 2 million confirmed cases by
June as new infections continued to rise in 20 states.
New Zealand has gone through a series of phases
from the adoption of a precautionary approach until
announcing a four-level alert system to designate
which measure to apply depending on the extent of
the virus’s presence; a lockdown policy was taken
immediately after Level 4 was declared on 25 March
(Wilson, 2020). As for Asia, India addressed its early
pandemic condition with Prime Minister Narendra
Modi ordering a one-day Janata Curfew as a socialdistancing trial aiming to reverse epidemic growth
(“What is Janata Curfew,” 2020). Based on these cases
in different nations,higher-income countries with less
population tend to execute a more structured approach
than middle- to lower-income and more populated
countries. It happens in most developing countries
due to delinquency in intervention and lack of preparedness for primary infection prevention, control
measures, and other minimum requirements in place
(Hopman et al., 2020). Some countries have experienced a reduction in the curve and have declared an
early temporary success of the measures. In contrast,
others are still struggling to decrease the infection
rate, some of which have reached a critical position.
Nonetheless, it does not imply the spread of the virus
is terminated, not even in countries that have managed the measures. Take the example from one of
the leading countries with the best approach in the
battle against COVID-19. South Korea began easing
restrictions due to its continuous downward curve in
early May, only a few weeks after 32 new cases were
reported, creating fear of a second wave in the country
(Uddin, 2020). In this scenario, strict regulations and
adequate facilities cannot necessarily guarantee the
eradication of the virus.
With the various backgrounds and capabilities
that each nation entails, the degree and emergency
response of the COVID-19 pandemic will be disparate. Therefore, this article will provide a distinctive
collateral perspective of the condition and management to handle the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic.
The discussion followed is about the coronavirus
pandemic situation in Indonesia, with a case study
explicitly located in Jakarta as the representing
region due to the dire condition with the number of
cases that seem to keep escalating. In comparison
with other less populous countries, Indonesia is the
fourth most populous country in the world and has
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been hit hard by the impact of Covid-19 for a very
long time (Djalante, et.al., 2020). On March 31st, one
month after confirmation of the first two cases in the
country on March 2, President Joko Widodo declared
the emergency COVID-19 public health. By the end
of December 2020, more than eight thousand new
cases have been tested daily in Indonesia. COVID-19
confirmed cases are second among ASEAN countries
in Indonesia (Nugraha, et.al., 2020). But the death
toll is the highest. Both positive cases and deaths are
expected to continue to increase, considering that,
compared with other countries, the current total testing by one million Indonesians is still low. Apropos
to the COVID-19 related regulation in Indonesia, the
government has established several foundations. One
of them is the Presidential Decree of the Republic of
Indonesia, concerning the determination of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) public health emergency and
the determination of non-natural disasters spreading
coronavirus disease as a national disaster. During this
period, the Government of Indonesia has also taken
important steps to reduce, control, and mitigate Covid
19's spread, in particular through increasing the capacity of hospitals in particular hospitals designated for
referral hospitals of COVID-19 patients, establishing
the National COVID-19 emergency team; physical distancing, and conducting hand-wash, cousing
and sneeze etiquette. Besides these programs, two
weeks after the initial case has been confirmed, the
Central government has requested social distance,
which is restricted by April 2020 and regulated the
large social distancing (Pembatasan Sosial Berskala
Besar/PSBB). As an implementation of Regulations
of the 2018 Health Quarantine Law restricting movement of people and goods within a check zone, the
President issued government Regulation 21/2020 concerning large-scale social distances but the President
did not allow regional governments to close their
borders. With the foundations provided, citizens are
expected to be able to comprehend and esteem it as
a standard benchmark in response to the pandemic.
Nevertheless, more effort are necessary to restrict
substantive mobility to slow down the transmission.
The government has issued several measures as an
initiative of COVID-19 emergency enactment. To
this moment, the official national policy issued by the
government includes the regulation of Large-Scale
Social Restriction (PSBB), published on 31 March
through Government Regulation Number 21 of 2020,
in addition to other measures. The central government
prefers the policy by adjusting the extent and provisions of the respective regional government. LSSR is
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applied as the primary approach for social distancing
measure and mobility control and has been carried
out by several provinces following DKI Jakarta. The
initial area with an extension of the application has
been applied since. Large-scale social restrictions
include school closures and places of work, restrictions on religious and public activities. In addition
to the large-scale social restrictions laid down in the
Health Quarantine Act, there are three additional measures: home quarantine, hospital quarantine and local
quarantine. Regional quarantine measures in certain
areas mean border restrictions. The central government permits regional authorities to apply for the
closure of their borders, however, under public health
emergency measures, not large areas. Provincial and
local governments can apply large-scale social restriction only, while only smaller areas should be imposed
regional quarantines, also called partial quarantines.
Provinces and local governments are not allowed to
close their borders without large regional quarantines.
As a capital region holding the center of Indonesia’s
essential sectors and the initiator of Large-Scale
Social Restriction, it is indisputable that Jakarta has
a great responsibility for all programs conducted. DKI
Jakarta is chosen as the case study of this research
because the capital, DKI Jakarta, was first to act on
school and business closures on mid-March then went
Large-scale social restrictions on 10 April 2020. The
number of Covid-19 cases is also the highest compared to other provincial governments. The cases in
DKI Jakarta is 24% of the total cases in Indonesia.
It also considers that other regions track the city in
particular during this emergency period. The First
Large-Scale Social Restriction started operating on
10 April 2020, with its transition phases implemented
as a relief from the primary policy. The local superintendence is based on the Decree of the Governor
of Special Region of Jakarta No. 380 of 2020 and
Governor Regulation Number 33 of 2020 as the
ground law. During the pandemic, the provincial government issued a range of initiatives and legislation
to prevent and mitigate the virus's proliferation while
monitoring the development of infection and demographic mobility. Notwithstanding, cases continue to
increase along with changes in the Large-Scale Social
Restriction period leading to fluctuations in daily
positive cases recorded in DKI Jakarta monitoring
data. Previous studies about Covid-19 in Indonesia
have mainly discussed about responses taken by the
government, NGO and the community (Djalante,
et. Al, 2020), knowledge, attitudes and behavior
toward the prevention of Covid-19 through social
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distancing among Indonesian community (Yanti,
et.al, 2020), and misinformation related to Covid-19
in Indonesia (Nasir, et.al., 2020). Several previous
studies are discussing relevant issues to this paper,
including empirical research on the complexities of
PSBB policies with their various challenges in line
with the Regulation of Minister of Health Number
9 of 2020 (Disantara, 2020), evaluation review of
the repercussion of PSBB implementation on community acquiescence and policy objectives (Syafri et
al., 2020), evaluation of the COVID-19 measures in
Indonesia, analysis on gatherings restriction before
the pandemic (Kuipers et al., 2020), and many more.
However, most of these studies mainly revolve around
the association between regulation with its empirical context or the enforcement of a national-level
restrictive course. There are limited studies that comprehensively discuss the LSSR implementation and
its efficiency when acclaimed to be the appropriate
method to control the COVID-19 outbreak.
Moreover, sketching from the previous academic
literatures, limited research has discussed about the
effectiveness of large-scale social restrictions particularly in Jakarta Provincial government. Therefore, this
study is important to discuss because it explores how
provincial government mitigates an ever-increasing
number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Jakarta
which stipulates the large-scale social restrictions.
The restriction consists of closing schools and offices,
limiting religious gatherings, public facilities, social
and cultural activities and other matters related to
defence and security, as well as transportation. For
the accumulative reasons, this article seeks to fill that
gap by investigating the extent of Large-Scale Social
Restriction implementation with the case study in the
special region of Jakarta, in the context of whether it
is a useful measure for Jakarta society in response to
COVID-19 emergency to prevent more transmission.
The terminology pursued in this article is the immediate local government response to resolve issues
relevant to the pandemic's presence, applying the most
appropriate strategy and suppressing additional cases
of COVID-19 infection; thereupon socio-economic
bandwagon would recover efficiently. Therefore, this
paper is divided into several parts: introduction, literature review, research methodology, case study,
discussion, and conclusion.
Local Emergency Management
At the local scale, emergency managers are as
essential as they are at the national scale for their roles
as first responders in local areas. It includes every
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local government agency and other related stakeholders. Respectively, the management of emergency
situations in a much smaller region can be seen as a
sample to reflect a wider area. Therefore, local authorities need to pay attention to what could effectively
overcome emergencies by leveraging existing local
resources to enhance community recovery. Gerber
(2015) points out through his hazards management
study on climate change action in the United States
that distinguishing how key administrators interpret
policy issues within related content would allow local
government to understand the municipal approach
used for implementation. He also mentions some
factors that managers and policymakers should consider to amend practices such as initiative integration,
community consensus on risk vulnerability through
awareness-raising, and uncertainty about general
community political characteristics for local government action (Gerber, 2015). With this consciousness,
local authorities' primary responsibility to resolve
critical situations can be supported by collaborative
work among crucial stakeholders to scrutinize the
particulars that need to be clarified. On the other hand,
implementation attributed to mitigation will be more
difficult if actors work individually.
Policy Effectiveness
As a preliminary point, the terminology of effectiveness is commonly used to assess a product or
a program. In particular to aspects of government,
effectiveness is usually accustomed to determining the
success or failure of the outcome of a policy or law.
Policies are pivotal in rummaging and alleviating the
state of a situation. In brief, policy articulates denotation in purpose to behavioral changing in a positive
sense, while policy instrument is the expedient or a
specific measure to translate that intent into action
(Mees et al., 2014). Discussions on policy effectiveness are not far from the understanding of its grey
areas where it can translated as a program success,
process success, or political success (McConnell,
2010; McConnell and Marsha; 2010). Thus, discussing the effectiveness of policies translates to
addressing two regards. The first one is goal setting,
including targets, indicators, and time frames, which
is a critical step in legitimizing policies, followed
by policy instruments' execution through effective
governance (Jacob et al., 2019, pp. 278).
RESEARCH METHOD
The authors used secondary data analysis due to
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the flexibility and can be utilized in several ways, also
an empirical exercise with procedural and evaluative steps (Doolan & Froelicher, 2009). The author’s
time and focus were centered on finding multitudinous data and information to be further investigated
while still working according to the research question. Additionally, using case studies helps the author
investigate a real-life phenomenon in a specific context, carried out in an explorative and comprehensive
manner (Ridder, 2017; Yin, 2009). Case studies can
be discourses of an individual, group, organization,
event, problem, or an anomaly (Burawoy, 2009;
Stake, 2005). This article's case study stands around
the Large-Scale Social Restriction implementation in
Jakarta, as the significant intervention conducted by
the DKI Jakarta Provincial Governance. This policy
was executed following the COVID-19 global pandemic's jeopardizing conditions that took its expense
on the majority of the population since early 2020.
In this article, the Jakarta Provincial Government's
established regulations under the central policy of
Large-Scale Social Restriction will be analyzed to
interpret how the sequence of regulations during
the implementation of LSSR defines its effectiveness further to cultivate a framework that assists the
understanding of COVID-19 emergency management. Major examples of secondary data sources for
scientific research include an easy dataset provided
by governments, research institutions, and other
organizations (Sun and Lipsitz, 2017). The research
object in this article was ascertained through existing
literary work such as published journals, scientific
reports, datasets from official websites conducted by
the government, international organization websites,
and news articles. Real-life data analysis and interpretation help incubate the author’s inherent motivation
and sustained attention to the study (Erwin, 2015).
External information is described from articles in
mass media and international organization website to
retrieve an updated follow up as the case study used
in this article is still actively operated. The data used
in this article is both numeric and non-numeric, which
include secondary collected data from interviews,
ethnographic, accounts, documents, or conversation
(Smith, 2008).
General Overview of COVID-19 Situation in DKI
Jakarta
Occupying a position as the largest city and the
capital of Indonesia, Jakarta has never faded away
from the prominence of its city. It is estimated that
the population in Jakarta by 2020 is over 10.7 million,
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with a population density of 14.464 people per square
kilometers, making it one of the fastest-growing
economies in the world, according to data (World
Population Review, 2020). However, by compactness
within the area, there is a new level of suffocation,
particularly during the current emergency period of
the COVID-19 pandemic. DKI Jakarta is currently
renowned for the epidemic of COVID-19 in Indonesia
at 191,075 total confirmed cases by 4 January 2021,
along with 14,670 active cases and 3,369 total deaths
(Kementrian Kesehatan RI, 2021). Since 3 March
2020, the confirmed cases of infection continued to
surge with relevant data collected and is accessible to
the public through websites established by the government. It is stated that around 45% of confirmed
cases in Jakarta are asymptomatic; meanwhile, 40%
display moderate symptoms, and 15% develop severe
symptoms (“Almost Half Jakarta”, 2020). Due to the
relatively low testing level, the number of cases has
been sorely underreported. It is difficult to track the
actual number of positive infections and the death toll
(Fadly and Sari, 2020).
Therefore, the government has established
hundreds of policy agendas, including regulation,
program operation, guidelines, and monitoring by
the governor and related agencies. In minimizing
the spread of COVID-19, the Jakarta city government applied Social Distancing as the most preferred
intervention, which has been implemented since 10
April 2020, requiring closures of public facilities,
schools, and many other venues with the potential of
public gatherings. One study discerns that the most
crucial manageable parameter to reduce COVID-19
is infection rate, followed by the effectiveness of selfisolation and quarantine, stipulating the government
to be vigilant and consistent in initiating the policies
(Aldila et al., 2020). Hence the government’s assertiveness in encouraging community discipline will
have a distinct impact on the public, regardless of
disagreements and contradictions. It is because, in
reality, there are still many people who neglect health
protocols such as not wearing masks, not social distancing, and not maintaining personal hygiene after
physical contact, despite the skyrocketing cases every
day. Moreover, the government urgently needs to
maintain facilities to align resources and needs. It
is due to the underdevelopment of referral hospitals and the allocation of health equipment in each
alternate health care facility, as evidenced by the
high concentration of unassigned positive cases in
West Jakarta, whereas the increasing distribution is
entered on Central Jakarta (Silalahi et al., 2020). In
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the meantime, citizens’ participation has a crucial
role in overcoming the pandemic by strictly adhering to health guidelines, enforcing personal hygiene
behavior in daily life, and educating themselves on
safe measurement during the pandemic period.
Implementation of DKI Jakarta Large-Scale
Social Restriction
The city government of Jakarta has conducted
Large-Scale Social Restriction as the primary initiative in controlling movement and social gathering to
obviate the increased local occurrence of COVID19 transmission in Jakarta. This policy is under the
decision and regulation issued by the Governor Anies
Baswedan of DKI Jakarta, along with his administrative forces, as well authorized by the Central
Government and the Ministry of Health of Indonesia.
The scope of LSSR policy predominantly interdicts
all non-essential activities in public places, religious activities involving mass gatherings, closure
of schools, and most workplaces, excluding those
that serve essential needs for public or government
officials well as mode of transportation. Furthermore,
penalties and administrative fines are also applied to
individuals or companies that contravene the regulation. The implementation of LSSR firstly carried
out on 10 April, with a span of two weeks of incubator period, amid experts’ criticism, implying the
policy would be more effective if conducted for at
least three months, reflecting cases in other countries
(Wijaya, 2020). Apart from the general outline, LSSR
still acquires varying opinions on its application in
practice. It is most compelled by deterioration in the
economic sector and declining public compliance
due to the inconsistent implementation. The enforcement of LSSR has brought immense economic losses,
particularly for many citizens who lost their jobs or
businesses are closed. While social assistance has
been offered, including the redesign of Prework Card
(Kartu Prakerja), it only lasts for a short period and not
commensurate with the repercussion of the employment partnership termination, which betides in the
long term for laborers in Jakarta (Mahadiansar et al.,
2020). Moreover, the availability of health facilities
and resources is also progressively disproportionate
compared to the spike in cases of COVID-19 infection in Jakarta, resulting in overcrowding capacity
and growing numbers of infected health personnel,
contributing to an overwhelming crisis of treatment.
The testing complement has also not been augmented.
Although the minimum capacity set by WHO, which
is 1 test per 1,000 population per week, has been
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transcended, the quantity of testing does not entirely
determine the actual epidemiological situation due
to quality factors, such as the sensitivity of the test
equipment and the adequacy of the test implementation procedure (Saputra and Salma, 2020).
Throughout 2020, the implementation of LSSR has
been carried out multiple times, including a sequence
of LSSR in early April, the Transitional version of
LSSR, and the LSSR Emergency Brake. The initial
success of LSSR is shown in the first two months,
with several indicators of the spread of COVID19 eliminated by more than 50% (Andriani, 2020).
However, despite the continuous operation of LSSR,
many people are still found to be disobedient towards
the policy. According to the Corona Jakarta website's
visualization data, the total violation reports have
reached 7,787, mainly recorded in South Jakarta and
East Jakarta, with the highest violation of peace and
order disturbances. The mobility of citizens detected
by Waze data is still relatively high, with the average
flow of residents’ vehicles reaching 20.25 km/h during
the first transactional version of the LSSR period
(Corona Jakarta, 2020). It indicates that people's
movement remains high despite the growing cases
of infection and the application of LSSR. During the
several weeks of the Transitional LSSR, the restriction
was relaxed for economic purposes, which unfortunately contributed to an escalation in infection rate
within a short time (Hasan et al., 2020). To this matter,
Sulasih (2020) analyzed factors that caused the ineffectiveness of LSSR implementation in DKI Jakarta.
Among those mentioned, it includes legal awareness,
the economic impact on middle- to lower-class society, crime occurrence, lack of discipline by road users,
and the implementation period of LSSR, which has
been extended many times (Sulasi, 2020).
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Measuring the effectiveness of Large-Scale Social
Restriction policy requires a process of charting existing information and observational data, which is then
analyzed using specific indicators. Identification of
data and information can be made by scrutinizing
the results found through each phase of LSSR, later
be assessed by synchronizing it with the indicators
determined for effectiveness. The results in this article
will be based on the following indicators: decline
in COVID-19 daily active cases; coherent law and
regulation enforcement; conducive coordination
between different levels of government; and community compliance to existing regulation implementation
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of LSSR hitherto has carried multiple periods, including the extension phase under four central models
establishment, namely: the first LSSR; LSSR First
Transition (LSSR T); LSSR Emergency Brake (LSSR
EB); LSSR Second Transition (LSSR T 2). There are
two graphs included in this article. Figure 1 illustrates
the peregrination of COVID-19 positive case progress
throughout each LSSR phase. Figure 2 compares positive cases, mortality, and recovery numbers between
the four significant LSSR periods. Some LSSR periods contain different timeframes. Hence, it affects the
calculation of numbers in each period. The positive
rate in Figure 1 is illustrated to have a prolonged
increase since the first LSSR was executed until the
latest implementation despite having several fluctuations. In contrast, figure 2 shows a subtle number
distinction between positive rate and recovery rate.
Meanwhile, the mortality rate remains low yet to be
significantly increased in both Transitional periods.
1) Pre Large-Scale Social Restriction
During this period, the numbers are still low,
considering acknowledgment of the virus; hence,
the management is still under observation. The
Jakarta City Government has been forecasting the
Figure 1. COVID-19 Positive Case Count Throughout
All Periods of the LSSR Jakarta Timeline in 2020

citizens of Jakarta to be aware of the novel coronavirus (nCoV) pneumonia through the Health Office
Circular 18/SE/2020 on 22 January 2020 and further
in cooperation with the Ministry of Health through
the issuance of the Health Office Letter no. 21 of
2020. During this time, the measures taken by the
Jakarta City Government included the dissemination of health information, the formation of a task
force to accelerate the managing of COVID-19, the
enhancement in the prevention and early detection of
infection spread, the temporary shutdown of crowd
permits and public facilities, the launch of the official website for COVID-19-related information, the
establishment of referral hospitals, the disinfection
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in selected areas, and many more. Office and educational activities began to be discontinued in March,
substituted by work-from-home and home learning
protocols. Initiatives to minimize crowds' potential
are also carried out, such as advocating the social
distance measure, postponing religious activities in
houses of worship, suspending the Car Free Days
program, and modifying and limiting mass transport
services.
The allocation of funds operates the provision of
assistance to medical personnel and the general public
for COVID-19 preventive programs, the distribution
of 1 million masks at affordable prices on Pasar Jaya,
the provision of Rp. 215,000 per person/day as supplying 40,000 PPE from BNPB for medical personnel
(Corona Jakarta, 2020). Usage adjustment of the BOS
and BOP PAUD investment components, equal education in the context of home learning, and providing a
certificate of incapability for the Jakarta Smart Card
through the JakEvo application are also applied.
Moreover, a line of medical treatment is offered
through assistance programs for HIV, tuberculosis,
psychosocial support, and the provision of deworming
avoidance drugs to help people with special needs.
DKI Jakarta declared an emergency response to the
outbreak of COVID-19 for the first time from 20
March to 2 April 2020 through Governor Decree No.
337 of 2020, which was subsequently extended to
19 April, creating standard operating procedures for
the appointment and funeral of COVID-19 deceased
bodies (Corona Jakarta, 2020). By the end of March
2020, a proposal was made by the Jakarta governor to
employ quarantine in the capital area. However, the
letter was rejected by President Joko Widodo on the
premise of not wanting social disorder problems that
happened in other countries. Instead, the president
wanted to impose LSSR as an option. During the
pre-LSSR era, the testing tools used for tracing were
still rapid tests. The testing process was carried out
for the first time on 20 March 2020 by door-to-door
mechanism, wherein medical teams visited selected
residential houses to operate the test (Nurita, 2020).
2)The First Large-Scale Social Restriction
The first LSSR in Jakarta started effectively on 10
April within 14 operational days. Prior to the inaugural phase, a variety of guidelines appertaining to LSSR
implementation in Jakarta was delivered by Governor
Anies Baswedan of DKI Jakarta on 7 April. Among
the essential rules conveyed, teaching and learning
activities were officially diverted to home, along
with the termination of offices besides eight sectors:
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health, food, energy, finance, communication, logistics, essential needs, strategic industry (Sari, 2020).
Celebrations, including weddings, were only allowed
to be processed in the religious affairs office without
being permitted to have a reception. All public and
private entertainment facilities were closed to prevent
gatherings, followed by restrictions on operational
sorting of passengers for all public transportation in
the city and the use of private vehicles in and out of
town to minimize population movement. It follows the
prohibition of crowding over five people by imposing sanctions for violators. Assistance for citizens
during early LSSR was provided by the distribution
of necessities for vulnerable poor people who had
been affected by the pandemic. Long-distance shopping services through the Pasar Jaya BUMD, which
is available in 105 traditional markets, and allowing
delivery of goods via online motorcycle taxis facilitated long-distance transactions. At the beginning of
the LSSR period, law enforcement officers' patrols
were operated to monitor violations. However, the
security officers only gave sanctions in the form of
warnings, causing many violations to remain either
by personal acts or companies outside the permitted
sectors that forced offline work.
During the enforcement of the first LSSR, the
Central Government jurisdiction frequently affected
the application of LSSR and other coronavirus-related
policies by the Jakarta city government. Among them
was the termination of the locomotion of intercity
and inter-provincial public transport in Jakarta; on
30 March, it was canceled by the substitute minister of transport at the time, Luhut Pandjaitan, on the
pretext of not having an economic impact examination (Putri, 2020). Moreover, the Minister of
Transportation intruded the prohibition of passenger
transportation for online motorcycle taxis in April
2020 by articulating the opposite, with the issuance
of Regulation of the Minister of Transportation No.
18 of 2020 article 11 paragraph 1 letter (d), which
allows passenger transportation services, confusing
the online motorcycle taxi operation. An uncontrolled surge of travelers, with a rampant influx and
exodus of the capital city, happened in May 2020 due
to the obscurity by the Ministry of Transportation
regarding Eid Fitr’s homecoming travel. Moreover,
a series of LSSR policies have been bombarded by
varying responses, including disputes from Economic
Coordination Minister Airlangga Hartarto, Minister of
Industry Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita, and Minister
of Trade Agus Suparmanto, on the grounds of the
deterioration in the stock market and the threat of a
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recession.
3)The First Period of Large-Scale Social Restriction
Transitional
Entering the transition period of LSSR, the DKI
Jakarta Government eased the existing regulations
due to declining daily case reports during the first
LSSR. The regulation's relaxation included granting permits for office activities, religious activities
in houses of worship, and operation of shopping
centers and markets with a 50% maximum capacity.
Additionally, online motorcycle taxi operations were
permitted to transport passengers while maintaining
health protocols, while private vehicles were allowed
to drive to a limit of 2 persons per row of seats, or 50%
of passenger capacity for public vehicles. Traffic rules
also applied in this transitional phase where the OddEven system was reinstated. The set of regulations
referred to are the key points that distinguish it from
the first LSSR in April, given the regular number of
COVID-19 cases in DKI Jakarta appears to be sloping
down and under control shown in Figure 1. However,
not long after that, apropos the LSSR relaxation, the
daily cases continued to rise since July even though
it could still be balanced with treatment and isolation
facilities.
A substantial increase occurred in August (Figure
1), considering the presence of joint leave and holidays, which led many people to take the opportunity
to spend their holidays between 15 to 22 August 2020.
As a result, a 49% rise in active cases in the following two weeks from 7,960 to 11,824, followed
by a 17% rise in mortality numbers (“COVID DKI
Melonjak Karena,” 2020). In a live broadcast on the
YouTube channel of the presidential secretariat on 10
September 2020, the spokesperson for the COVID-19
Task Force, Wiku Adisasmito, said that all areas in
Jakarta had reached the red zone within five weeks,
which shows the state of an increased level of transmission (“Zona Merah 5 Minggu,” 2020). As cases
spiked during this transitional period occurred, the
existence of a transitional phase, the restrictions that
have been imposed on citizens have become even
laxer. It is evidenced by Car Free Day activities' permission resume, emboldening the public to leave their
house and occupy street points in the capital area.
4)Large-Scale Social Restriction Emergency Brake
The DKI Jakarta Provincial Government retightened the LSSR protocol, reckoning the number
of active cases had escalated since July 2020 and
got recalcitrant by September, when the month's
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Figure 2. Comparison of COVID-19 Positive, Mortality,
and Recovery Rates During Main Periods of LSSR

surge accounted for 25% of total cases since March
2020. It affected the number of deaths (Figure 2) to
increase, and isolation beds were in danger of being
crammed. Therefore, another total LSSR with the
name Emergency Brake was implemented to convey a
message of concern over the dire situation of COVID19 in Jakarta. The period was enacted for a month,
including the extension. From a policy perspective,
there were significant differences in the implementation of LSSR Emergency Brake, such as (1) the
reinforcement of Work From Home or the number
of people in the office may only be covered up to
25% of capacity; (2) religious activities in houses
of worship in residential neighborhoods only with a
maximum capacity of 50%, while the ones in the red
zone must remain closed; (3) public facility shutdown
and prohibition of gathering activities for more than
five people, exception of activities to redeem basic
needs; (4) limitation of public motorized vehicle passengers with a maximum of 50% and private cars to a
maximum of 2 people per row of seats, except for the
domicile of passengers in the same address.
During the Emergency Brake period (Figure 2),
the daily active numbers appeared to be managed,
reflecting the progress in lowering the number of
additional cases. The Emergency Brake cycle was
effectively administered for a month, including its
extension, by tightening the protocols to restrict the
public's movement. The addition of daily active cases
during this period continued to decline and reached
less than 1,000 numbers three times. Furthermore,
the percentage of active cases after the first 2 weeks
of LSSR EB implementation showed a slowdown
from 49% to 12% on 23 September 2020. Despite the
temporary success, the DKI Jakarta governor clarified that keeping stable daily cases was not the final
goal. Instead, the breaking of transmission chain is
the ambition that needs to be emphasized (“Kasus
Aktif COVID-19 Melandai,” 2020).
The Second Period of Large-Scale Social
Restriction Transitional
On 12 October 2020, Governor Anies Baswedan of
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COVID-19 pandemic. Developing a policy amidst
the pandemic era that regulates all aspects of socioeconomic respect is a tremendous responsibility and
is not an easy task. Therefore, by distinguishing issues
that are likely to occur, it can help identify the most
appropriate route forward to resolve those issues
through involvement based upon conserved and sustained value-added involvement of all stakeholders
(Shaw and Muncy, 2014).
The Issues of Large-Scale Social Restriction Policy
Stumbling on various obstacles along the path to
eliminating COVID-19 transmission, the prosecution of Large-Scale Social Restriction in DKI Jakarta
has not met a permanent solution in presiding over
the regulation in general public. What needs to be
acknowledged is the objective of LSSR policy according to Governors Regulation Number 33 Year 2020
are; 1) Restrict particular activities and movements
and/or goods to repress the transmission of COVID19; 2) improve anticipation toward the evolution of
the COVID-19 amplification; 3) Enhance health management initiatives in combating COVID-10 and;
4) Cotrol the social and economic consequences
of the COVID-19 spread (Tuti et al., 2020). So far,
the policy’s effectiveness has been confirmed by a
reduction in positive daily graph statistic for several periods, including the initial LSSR phase and
LSSR Emergency Brake. As an instance, DKI Jakarta,
which on April 5 contributed 50% of national cases,
on May 5 after the LSSR was carried out for a month,
it decreased tp 39% (Umasugi, 2020). However there
are numerous things that have not reached a success.
In brief, the number of infections are most at peak
during transitional phases of LSSR. This is caused
by internal and external issues, which will be deliberated throughout this section. Before we discuss
the issues, it is appropriate to categorize the assessment by defining strengths and weaknesses for each
period using the relevant criteria. Systematic conceptualization is used to find relative perceived strength
and weakness for policy implementation (Eckhard
and Parizek, 2020). Using criteria will appraise the
acquirement and estimate the range of strength or
weakness that later on will be discussed with further explanations (Dingeldey et al., 2017). Criteria
included in this discussion aligning to Jacob et al.'s
(2019) acquisition are response speed, coherence or
convergence, enabling or constraining factors, time
frame, unintended effects, stakeholder involvement,
and feasibility (Table 1). Acknowledging the proper
approach, instruments, roles, and responsibility of
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DKI Jakarta withdrew the PSBB Emergency Brake.
It reverted to the Transitional LSSR volume 2 since
the addition of daily cases declined along with LSSR
Emergency Brake's success. The capacity in offices,
recreation areas, wedding ceremonies, and fitness centers was diminished from 50% (on LSSR Transition 1)
to a maximum of 25%. In contrast, shopping centers,
restaurants, and places of worship were limited to 50%
of capacity, consequently lowering citizens’ outside
mobility. It happened as the discovery of a new cluster
of virus transmission by the COVID-19 handling task
force, namely through offices and families. However,
according to Corona Jakarta's official website (2020),
during the LSSR Transitional Extension 6 (Figure 1),
the number of tests had downscaled, leading to positive case numbers below 1,000 per day as recorded.
It created uncertainty because, on average, the daily
number of tests could exceed 10,000 persons a day,
whereas, from the end of October to the beginning of
November, the testing number was only up to 8,870.
The protocol, along with the minimal number of tests,
was a significant factor in the daily case reduction in
the first two weeks of Transitional 2 LSSR (“Sulitnya
Mengukur Pengaruh PSBB,” 2020).
During the shift of LSSR Emergency Brake to
LSSR Transitional Volume 2 on 11 to 16 October,
it was reported by the governor of DKI Jakarta to
be a highly concerning time, as there were several
demonstrations taking place in Jakarta, although it
did not expand the number of cases. However, after a
long holiday period from 28 October to 2 November
2020, there was a considerable rise of 3,707 additional
cases, with 40% of cases being from family clusters
(“Lonjakan Kasus Usai Libur Panjang,” 2020). Due
to a major factor, particularly to long holidays at the
end of October, alluding to joint leave on the feast of
the Prophet Muhammad SAW birthday. Following
Christmas and New Year celebrations, more people
were going outside to take a trip or vacation. It resulted
in an intractable accumulation that was interminable
until the beginning of the year 2021.
Based on the case study and results found above,
the implementation of Large-Scale Social Restriction
is indeed a complicated process. In the absence of
participation and reflection, guidelines and immaculate tools will not be efficient in addressing local
level policy management (Nilsen and Olsen, 2007).
Difficulties keep overwhelming the execution of
LSSR policy carried by internal and external factors.
These issues are the main reason why Large-Scale
Social Restriction performance has gone sideways
up to this moment to mitigate the emergency of the
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agencies is the general guidance in conducting disaster or emergency policy (Chong and Kamarudin,
2017). However, along with the practical process,
there may be some obstacles encountered from a different aspect. After congregating the strengths and
weaknesses of LSSR implementation, a further discussion on which factors most affect barriers to the
implementation was conducted to see the clarity of
this issue. Studies found several challenges related to
disaster knowledge factors, which recognize the lack
of each area and what is need to be improved further:
(1) technological; (2) social; (3) environmental; (4)
legal; (5) economic; (6) operational or managerial;
(7) institutional; (8) political (Pathirage et al., 2012).
1)Political and Institutional Factor
The two factors of politics and institution are coupled with the rationale of correlation between one
another. According to Silvia (2018), political structures and ideas describe much of the institutional,
Table 1. Strengths and weaknesses of each period of
Large-Scale Social Restriction in Jakarta

political group, and social actors involved in the policy
routine and their political attitude, which often define
the distribution of power in a society. Furthermore, In
modern and integrative democratic political systems,
the institutionalized rules that construct interactions
between political actors hold a profound influence
on the blame-game situation, notably on opponents'
accountability structure (Hinterleitner, 2020). During
the implementation of the LSSR policy, the Central
Government's interference has never ceased since the
beginning of execution to nowadays. It can be drawn
into two core arguments based on the result: an intervention that disrupts LSSR operation and the need for
complementary support. As already discussed, at the
start of the pandemic, several ministers clashed with
the LSSR scheme, emphasizing the risk of economic
turmoil and recession. When, as a matter of fact, in
emergency like the current pandemic, the public
lives' security is the primary concern without any
doubt. Also, the discrepancies between regulations
issued by the Central Government and the established
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LSSR rules, provokes skepticism from the community
regarding the coordination between two governmental
bodies. Political instability emerges as an essential
predictor of public sentiment on policies that inflict
costs in return for the promise of possible benefits
(Jacobs and Matthews, 2017). These contradicting
responses from the Central Government demonstrate
unpreparedness in counterpoising priority solutions
and the lack of cooperation between central and
regional governments. The interest of institutions and
political conflict between policymakers considerably
reinforce the political conflict over policy divergence,
which systematically is the property of agency and
policy (Oosterwaal and Torenvlied, 2012).
On the other hand, full support and the inclusion of
rigid national laws from the Central Government are
also indispensable to facilitate the adoption of local
policy processes. For instance, when local legislation regarding in-out of city restrictions is imposed,
the Central Government should endorse the enforcement by regulations equivalent to those, focusing on
the mass mobility of air, land, and sea transportation
per the authorities' capacity. With the presence of the
COVID- 19 pandemic being one of the ponderous
core issues, all government agencies' main objective must be on eradicating the virus outbreak, which
affects all other industries, and not exacerbating the
problem with contradictory or irrelevant regulations.
As various government entities are typically involved
in the implementation process, effective coordination
empowers the organization to counsel actions, processes, and efforts towards one common policy goal
(Toshkov, 2011; Treib, 2014; Andrews et al., 2012).
No matter how rigorous the local rules are, they will
not function effectively without the acquisition of
assistance from higher-level governments because
the society will be polarised and divided to adhere to
which regulation is more acceptable. Political factors
that determine the potential feedback for policy implementation include transitions in interest group roles,
the emergence of new interest, and exploiting political
sustainability (Mcdonnell and Weatherford, 2016).
The Central Government and the Local Government
must improve institutional synergies and reform their
respective interests to resolve the adversity endured
by both the region and nation as a whole.
2)Operational or Managerial Factor
In terms of substance, the scope of Large-Scale
Social Restriction policy encompasses most regulatory considerations that must be met by all levels of
society, with the assistance to support the financial
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and health. A policy enactment practically uses collusive approach of decision making. However, it
may result in inefficient policy implementation due
to paradoxes of equalization in policymaking and
versatility in implementation, incentive frequency
and goal displacement and bureaucratic impersonality, and the personalization of administrative ties
(Ahlers and Schubert, 2015; Zhou Xueguang, 2010).
Accordingly, a management approach in policy implementation is clarified by four specific variables:
internal mutualism relating to coordination mechanism or government and other agencies; external
mutualism, related to infrastructure and networking
facilities; policy expertise and information, relating
municipal human resources; and personnel immutability, related to different municipal organizational
echelon (Bondarouk et al., 2020). One of LSSR's
inefficiency reasons is grounded upon the duration
of LSSR application being too short, where each
phase, in general, lasted approximately two weeks.
Compared to other countries in particular with a solid
record of conquering the COVID-19 virus, the average restriction policy was prosecuted for three months
at the least. Although, debatably, this decision made
by DKI Jakarta Government was not without external
constraints interfered, such as agitation from other
stakeholders on the premises of economic decline.
Moreover, the amendments to the rules throughout
the varying LSSR periods and the inadequate enforcement of penalties for violators became a reflection of
this program's poor management.
The relaxation during transitional phases results
in an increase in public negligence due to the loosening of the restrictions, which led to an increase in
the number of positive cases. Legal authorities must
intensify surveillance and prosecution of sanctions
against offenders in concrete action and not just warnings. If the lockdown policy was not the ideal option
due to being too extreme to be adopted, imitating how
other countries administer strict discipline is the least
thing that could help make the LSSR policy to be
more obeyed. A practical approach plays a vital role
in rectifying any existing establishment within the
scenario to avoid misunderstanding. Effective monitoring and an evaluation blueprint are segments of the
credential in refining implementation mechanisms to
thoroughly see forward of what to persist and what to
abandon for the future time, endeavoring to mobilize
public support (Barthwal and Sah, 2008). The Local
Government must associate with other stakeholders
as part of a more substantial commitment towards
the policy. Management of different stakeholders is
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one of the critical facets in sustaining policy commitment, meaning it must be tangible in a various way
and ensured both short term and long term (Brynard,
2009).
3)Social and Economic Factor
The association between society and economics
has been found in several discourses. In this sense,
both factors have also become intertwining matters
for their importance and influence. As far as the social
dimension is concerned, it has become apparent that
one of the reasons why LSSR policy is difficult to
succeed over a long period is the lack of compliance
by many levels of community. Typically, a compliance program is structured as a precaution when faced
with an expected sanction equivalent to infringement's
social cost (Martinez, 2020). That is not the case in
the context of the COVID-19 situation in Jakarta. The
deteriorating emergency condition has prompted the
government to issue boundary restrictions instantly,
spurring non-compliance from citizens. Gofen (2015)
indicates that numerous studies delineate non-compliance as an incongruous behavior over a given policy
aspiration, with the person is viewed as uncongenial
in response to a policy change that can be in direct or
indirect behavior. Both of the non-compliance behaviors are apparent in this case, for instance, breaking
the law by refusing to be taken to the hospital or a
referral place when confirmed for COVID-19 (direct)
or not adhering to health protocols by not wearing a
mask in public (indirect). The disobedient attitude
from citizens complicates the pandemic situation.
It is hindered by invertebrate self-education about
the knowledge relating to the novel coronavirus
pandemic. Poor public understanding may trigger
numerous things, such as the absence of consequence
awareness practiced by violating the rules or the willful ignorance over what has occurred, leading to the
guidelines' insurrection. These two items are the most
likely to emerge within Jakarta citizens who violate
LSSR rules.
Notwithstanding, there is another reason that
underlies violations of LSSR regulation among communities or corporations, notably economic pressure.
Economic adversities may contribute to the convolution of a void between policy decisions and their
implementation when considering that social, political, economic, and administrative variables are not
adequately addressed in the process of analyzing
policy formulation (Makinde, 2005). The general
public in various economic classes and businesses
at different levels is undoubtedly affected by this
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pandemic, both by the virus infection's repercussions
and subsequent government regulations. Large-Scale
Social Restriction rules jeopardize economic activity
due to confinement on mobility and gathering capacity, even with the intention of individual safety due
to the pandemic emergency period. Being an emergency rule means that the manager's duty includes
setting out the agendas behind the emergency and
highlighting the renounced directions before pursuing public support for institutional re-ordering or
constitutional re-founding (White, 2015). In other
meaning, emergency officials may or may not always
have the imperative abetment from other stakeholders or the general public due to the immediate action
required. Simultaneously, with the need for significant
changes to adapt correctly to this unexpected new
situation, not all parties can embrace it civilly. For
those in distress, the situation forces them to resume
their activities and compromise their financial stability protection. Throughout this regard, intense social
assistance from the government is necessary, along
with creative engagement within businesses and
individuals to discover an alternative approach to
handle the current crisis. Social and economic implications are indeed critical in measuring the success
of policy implementation. Nevertheless, to integrate
these aspects, additional determinants are required as
a parameter of common goals outcome.
CONCLUSION
By analyzing the issued policies and regulations
using available data and information through the government’s website and the progress of COVID-19
cases, it is attested throughout the year of 2020 timeline that overall, the implementation of LSSR is not
effective to derogate COVID-19 spread. This is due
to the infection rate remained high until the cumulative positivity numbers in Jakarta reached 186,691
by January 1, 2020. As a fact, it contradicts to the
primary goal of LSSR according to Regulation of the
Governor of Special Region Capital City of Jakarta
Number 3 of 2021, which is to reduce the spread of
virus infection. This article has explained the extent
of local-level policy implementation effectivity in
addressing emergencies using the case study of LargeScale Social Restriction policy in Jakarta. The case
study illustrated the need for improvement in operational management, chaperoned by better cooperation
with the Central Government and higher obedience
by the public. This article identified LSSR implementation's success based on theoretical reference,
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correlating with established regulations and empirical evidence. Furthermore, the delinquency is also
pinpointed through referenced indicators, along with
discovered factors. The LSSR implementation can be
remarked from the regulation issued to the results of
the performance. The findings of LSSR implementation in Jakarta unveils both commendatory outcome
and inadequate default, influenced by several factors.
It is due to several variables such as insufficient
management to enact the policy, affected by poor
support from the Central Government. Consequently,
it creates diminishing public credence, leading to
non-compliance towards the regulation, which adds
to the influencing factor of LSSR implementation
efficiency. Findings from several different periods
of LSSR manifest that the enforcement of austere
measures and the maintenance of strict penalties
help control public adherence and minimize the
transmission of the COVID-19 virus with consistent
perpetration. Public safety is the highest priority for
the establishment of this policy; hence, the effectiveness of this legislation depends on public confidence
in local government by complying with the rules.
To support the realization, the Central Government
should emphasize law enforcement more to combat
the pandemic crisis in this country by incorporating
stricter guidelines to the broader coverage domains
and strengthening coordination with regional and
local governments to avoid misunderstanding and
maladministration. This article's limitation was that
Jakarta is considered the center of administration
and various other sectors, making communal residents from peripheral areas such as Bogor, Depok,
Tanggerang, and Bekasi carry out the main activities
in Jakarta. It causes daily movement to be continuous, so it is difficult to control by only Jakarta City
Government. Moreover, peripheral communities' relationship appertains to the COVID-19 management
system and policies within each of these areas that
are not included in this article's discussion.
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